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Martin Mølholm
The Existential ›Anruf‹ as the Agency of the 
Anti-Objectives of the Discourse on Stress
Zusammenfassung: Basierend auf zwei umfassenden diskursarchäologischen Studien dokumentie-
ren Mølholm und Vetner, dass im dänischen Stress-Diskurs Handlungsfähigkeit und Anweisungen 
nicht zu finden sind. Stattdessen, zeichnet sich der Diskurs durch Anti-Zielsetzungen aus, insofern 
Einstellungen, Verhalten und Handlungen eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen. Der Artikel untersucht, 
inwiefern die Abwesenheit von Handlungsfähigkeit und die Anwesenheit von Anti-Zielsetzungen 
selbst Handlungsfähigkeit, in der Form des existenziellen Anrufs des Gewissens des Daseins, ist. Das 
moderne Individuum muss einer ständig wachsenden Menge von Normen, Forderungen und Erwar-
tungen nachkommen: »Sich verlierend in die Öffentlichkeit des Man und sein Gerede überhört es im 
Hören auf das Man-selbst das eigene selbst« (Heidegger 1967, S. 271). Dieser Artikel wird den engen 
Zusammenhang zwischen einem ›yet-to-be-disclosed-place‹ der Anti-Zielsetzungen und einem ei-
gentlichen Sein-können des Daseins demonstrieren, bei dem der ›Anruf‹ das Man-selbst zurück zum 
Sich-selbst ruft.
Schlagwörter: Existenzialismus; Heidegger; Archäologie des Wissens; Foucault; Stress; Da-sein;
Abstract: Two large, Danish discursive-archaeological studies document an absence of agency and in-
structions in the discourse on stress. Instead, the discourse on stress is pregnant with anti-objectives: at-
titudes, behaviors and actions that are to play a less dominating role. This article explores the possibility 
that the absence of agency and the presence of anti-objectives is an agency in itself, in the form of an ex-
istential Anruf (calling) of the conscience of the Da-sein. As the late-modern individual abides to an ev-
er-growing set of norms, claims and expectations, it loses itself in the idle talk of the They (Heidegger 
1996, S. 250). This article will demonstrate the close correlation between the yet-to-be-disclosed-place 
of the anti-objectives and the Authentic potentiality-of-being of Da-sein, to which the ›Anruf‹ calls the 
they-self back to it-self.
Keywords: Existentialism; Heidegger; Archaeology of Knowledge; Foucault; Stress; Da-Sein;
1
In May 2016, my colleague Mikael Vetner and I presented the results of our recently con-
ducted discourse-archaeological research on the absence of agency in the discourse on 
stress (Molholm/Vetner 2018) at a conference at the University of Illinois, USA1. Our 
study was based on the works of Michel Foucault and Reiner Keller. In our research we 
1 The research is based on an archive of more than 29,000 articles in Danish national and regional 
newspapers, journals and business- and labor market magazines from a five-year period ranging 
from January 1st. 2011 to December 31st. 2015, and the results were published in an article in 2018
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have found, that »rather than describing, displaying and putting forward a set of actions, 
norms and attitudes (in the same way as we know it from the discourses on for example 
globalization, health, safety, or learning), the statements of the stress discourse points to 
the cause and source [...]« (Mølholm/Vetner 2018 S. 17); that stress-reducing action-mark-
ers only occur as »vague anti-objectives« (Mølholm/Vetner 2018 S. 18) giving subtle sug-
gestions, that the late-modern worker do or be less of something which is otherwise per-
ceived to be fundamentally good: being flexible, dedicated, excited about their work, ac-
cessible, holding a positive attitude and be focused on developing their personal and 
professional competencies. In the discourses on globalization, learning and development, 
these norms and attitudes (flexibility, dedication, etc.) are accentuated as positive and 
good in the sense that they are productive, because they function as agents that are ur-
gently needed, if we – both individually and as welfare societies – are not to succumb to 
the threat that the globalization is posing to us, but instead are to leave the battle as win-
ners (Mølholm 2013, S. 245-282). Globalization is, as the US Undersecretary of State Stu-
art Eizenstat said in a 1999 speech, »an inevitable element of our lives. We cannot stop it 
any more than we can stop the waves from crashing on the shore« (Fairclough 2009, S. 
324), and as the battle is global, we are inevitably caught in a battlefield that we cannot 
leave. But as in any battle, fight and competition, the globalization has both winners and 
losers and is therefore verbalized as both an opportunity and a threat, a blessing and a 
curse. It holds promises of great fortune and immense happiness for the prosperous and 
enterprising, as well as omens of disaster and despair for those who does not realize that 
times have changed; those who are in an urgent need for »reality therapy« so they will 
»move themselves out of the red zone« (Head of Market Lars Goldschmidt, Danish Trade 
and Services in The Week-Letter A4, 2004, vol. 40, S. 19). 
In other words: as pregnant with agency the discourses on globalization, learning and 
development are, the discourse on stress is barren. The absence of agency is, seen from a 
discourse-archaeological point of view, the most significant feature of the stress discourse 
in, that it does not construct a correlated dispositif which subjectify the individual with a 
set of norms, knowledge, understanding, perception and attitude to guide his or her ac-
tions, behavior and talk.
After our presentation, we received a number of questions and comments. One ques-
tion, in particular, returned to my mind, over and over again, in the following days and 
weeks. No less vague than the anti-objectives of the stress discourse, the question in all its 
apparent simplicity was:
Could you not say that even the absence of agency has agency?
This question apparently raises a paradox: that there is presence in absence. There is, 
however, another possibility: that rather than stating a seemingly meaningless paradox, 
the question points to one of the obvious conclusions in Niklas Luhmann’s System The-
ory: that all systems – social, conscience and biological – have to select their next action 
and that choosing not to choose is also a choice, namely, the choice not to choose (Luh-
mann, 1991, S. 93 ff.; Luhmann 2016, S. 65 ff.). Thus, the absence of agency bears its own 
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specific form of agency. Or rather: It does not communicate a selection of ›this and not 
the other‹; an actualization of one action out of the infinite many which are then, at the 
same time, potentialized. Therefore, in the social world of communication on stress, 
there are no selections of actions that neither the social systems (German: Soziale Sys-
teme / Kommunikationssysteme) (e.g., organizations, institutions, teams, families, un-
ions) nor the systems of minds (German: Psychische Systeme/Bewußtseinssysteme) (hu-
man individuals) can link to and process within their own systems. Instead, the systems 
are left in a state of oscillation, wavering in a decided undecidedness about the handling 
of work-related stress, burn-out, anxiety and depression. In addition, that leaves the field 
of communication, as far as agency is concerned, wide open and empty for the discourses 
on globalization, learning and development.
Luhmann is, however, not the first to present the idea that the cognitive system, vis-a-
vis the consciousness of the human being, is destined to choose. In Being and Nothing-
ness, the French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre uses the term ›facticity‹ to describe that 
particular situation, which he later calls ›the human condition‹: a 
»perpetual contingency for which it (the for-itself, own clarification) assumes the re-
sponsibility and which it assimilates without ever being able to suppress it. This per-
petually evanescent contingency of the in-itself which, without ever allowing itself to 
be apprehended, haunts the for-itself and re-attaches it to being-in-itself – this contin-
gency is what we shall call the facticity of the for-itself« (Sartre 1943, S. 82-83).
I may, as a human being, not have chosen to be, but the fact that I exist forces me to 
choose. Even if I choose not to choose, that choice is, and can only be, mine. Thereby, a 
paradox occurs: that which forces and binds me at the same time makes me free. I am 
destined to be free. Martin Heidegger conditions the »being free of Da-sein for its exis-
tential possibilities« by making it clear that »freedom is only in the choice of the one, that 
is, in bearing the fact of not having chosen and not being able also to choose the others« 
((BT/SZ, § 58, S. 263/285)2.
Luhmann and Sartre represent two very different phenomenological positions, re-
spectively an epistemological and existential one. Luhmann’s position is a functionalistic 
theory in which social actions are to be explained by the functions they have in relation 
to the system: the continuation of (meaningful) operations (Luhmann 1991), while Sartre 
is concerned with the question of being and »the ultimate meaning of these two types 
[in-itself and for-itself, own clarification] of being« (Sartre 1943, S. xliii). Thus, to make 
choices is, from Luhmann’s and Sartre’s perspective, inherently related to two very differ-
ent aspects of human existence: cognition and consciousness; operations and being. 
While they both accentuate ›non-choice‹ as a choice nonetheless, Sartre not only makes 
an explicit connection between his concept of consciousness and Heidegger’s concept of 
2 Specifically, with references to Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time / Sein und Zeit I have adapted the 
commonly accepted and used method of reference to his philosophical work, used in this case and 
which I have used throughout the rest of the article.
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the Da-sein (Sartre 1943, S. xxxi) but also describes the human condition – »the for-itself 
is the in-itself losing itself as itself in order to found itself as consciousness« (Sartre 1943, 
S. 82) – in a way that has affinities to Heidegger’s distinction between winning and losing 
oneself and the existential conscience’s summoning of the Da-sein to »its own-most po-
tentiality-of-being-a-self« ((BT/SZ, § 58, S. 258/280; see also section 5).
I know the person who stated the question to be someone who does not engage in 
mundane, circular inferences, and I therefore had to pursue the question slightly further. 
My first impulse instinctively told me to look in the direction of Martin Heidegger (or 
maybe it was because I know the person who asked the question to be something of an 
expert on Heidegger, see, for example, Brinkmann 2004a and 2004b), more specifically 
his theory of existential conscience as he elaborates it in Being and Time (Heidegger 
1967/1996), in order to look for agency not in the communication of the outside world 
but in the wordless, silent speech of the conscience of the Da-sein (BT/SZ, § 56, S. 252-
253/273-274). Thus, it can also very well be argued that the above elaborated reflections 
on the work of both Luhmann and Sartre may appear as somewhat forced rationaliza-
tions.
2
In this article, I aim to demonstrate an affinity between the anti-objectives of the dis-
course on stress, all of them within the formation on working life discourses, and Martin 
Heidegger’s analysis of the existential conscience in Being and Time, more specifically his 
description of the antagonistic relation between The They and the authentic being of the 
Da-sein (BT/SZ, § 9, S. 40/42), and the »in every way opposite character« (BT/SZ, § 55) 
of listening to The They and hearing the call – der Anruf – of the existential conscience 
of the Da-sein.
Furthermore, I argue that just as the anti-objectives of the discourse on stress point 
the late-modern human being in the direction of a ›yet-to-be-disclosed-place‹, the exis-
tential conscience does the same: it points not to a specific action or any »factual occur-
rences« (BT/SZ, § 57, S. 258/280). Instead, it directs Da-sein, when it is lost, ›back‹ to its 
authentic (German: Eigentliches) »being-mine«, which is »my own [and] somehow al-
ways already decided« and to which Da-sein is related »as its truest possibility« (BT/SZ, 
§ 9, S. 40/42).
Such an endeavor may appear to constitute a ›methodological eclecticism‹ between, 
on one side, a highly descriptive approach, »the description of an archive« (Foucault 
1991, S. 59), to lay forward the at-any-given-moment regularity of statements constitut-
ing a given Discourse (in this case Discourse with an upper-case D, as opposed to with a 
lower-case), and, on the other, an existential-phenomenological analysis of the meaning 
of the anti-objectives and the absence of agency in the Discourse on stress (and not of 
stress as a lived experience). As I elaborate further later in this article (section 5), describ-
ing what occurs at the surface of emergence is limited to what we can ›see‹ – that which 
is actually there, in text. It is more about seeing than listening; more about the descriptive 
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how than the analytical why (Mølholm/Vetner 2016, S. 29); it is a delimitation of the ar-
chaeology of knowledge from the endeavors of the interpretive sciences, which would 
read the text as »the expression of the thought, the experience, the imagination, or the 
unconscious of the author, or, indeed, of the historical determinations that operated upon 
him« (Foucault 1982, S. 24). Heidegger’s existential phenomenology is concerned with 
the meaning of Being and a Da-sein that is not characterized by what it is, but how 
(Wentzer 2007, S. 487-488, 532).
This article is not an attempt to do both: describe a formation and suggest an interpre-
tation of what may hide beneath the surface of it, just waiting to be dug out by someone 
like me. Rather, the purpose is to address that which is described as absently there and to 
bring it forward in the light of the existential phenomenological theory of Being – how it 
›is‹ as an existential phenomenon: What is the meaning of ›being‹ or ›existence‹, and how 
do we come to be and exist in a world where the Discourse on stress holds only little and 
vague agency dressed in anti-objectives?
Finally, a few clarifications are needed: the aim of this article is not to add further per-
spectives and/or analysis of Heidegger’s collected work, nor to support or reject bits and 
parts of the various critical readings of his work (e.g., that of Arendt or Sartre). It is first 
and last to explore the potential of Heidegger’s concept of the existential conscience – as 
presented in Being and Time – to help us reflect upon the absence of agency in the dis-
course on stress as that which we vigorously speak of yet cannot come to a common, mu-
tual and collective understanding of and thus cannot act upon.
Furthermore, the aim of the article is not to add to the already excellent work done to 
understand stress as a lived, existential experience (e.g., in a Danish context, Charlotte 
Bloch’s: Flow and stress, sentiments and the culture of emotions in the everyday life (Da: 
Flow og stress, stemninger og følelseskultur i hverdagslivet), in which she, among others, 
draws from the work of Martin Heidegger), nor is it to add to studies within other fields 
of research on stress: anthropology, psychology, etc. Therefore, this article will not go fur-
ther into a paradigmatic question of how various scientific positions and fields of re-
search define, delimit and explain the occurrence of stress. The scope of the article is 
limited to the field of Discourse studies aiming to, as already mentioned, demonstrate 
affinities between a particular discursive phenomenon – anti-objectives as absent agency 
– and the Heideggerian concept of the existential conscience. For illustrative reasons, 
however, a number of examples from different publications addressing the phenomenon 
of stress have been included in sections 5 and 6.
3
In Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, what characterizes human existence is not 
that human beings are subjects that stand in opposition to a world of objects. The exist-
ence of the human being is an ›embedded‹ existence that he calls ›being-in-the-world‹. 
Thus, the human being is a being that occurs among other kinds of beings in the world – 
handy things at hand/handiness (German: Zuhandenheit), and objects/objectively pres-
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ent things (German: Vorhandenheit) – but in its own particular way and with its own par-
ticular, focused attention. Furthermore, Heidegger distinguishes between ›being‹ as a real 
entity and ›being‹ as nature or essence: Useful things (German: Zeug) and handiness; ob-
jectively present ›things’ (German: Vorhandenheit) and objective presence; Da-sein (the 
human being) and existence. In the following, I will give a brief introduction to useful 
things, objectively present things and Da-sein, before I, as outlined above, zoom in on the 
›Anruf‹ of the existential conscience of the Da-sein as a call from a yet-to-be-disclosed-
place.
A useful thing »is essentially ›something in order to…‹« that we encounter inner-
worldly (BT/SZ, § 15 & 18, S. 64/68, 77/83), the latter referring to the fact that the »world 
is always already ›there’ in all things at hand« (BT/SZ, § 18, S. 77/83) and thus has an in-
nerworldly existence. However, the world being already there also means a dissolving of 
the subject-object relation, since we can thereby only »meet things in the world objec-
tively« in the sense that »we always already understand the world on a pre-reflective 
level« (Brinkmann 2004a, S. 63). When I take a walk in the forest and see a tree before me, 
I instinctively ›know‹ it as a tree because I have come to become a human being that 
grows up in a world in which there are trees. I do not see the tree, then ›say‹ the word to 
myself, then realize that what is standing in front of me is a tree among thousands of other 
trees, and then come to realize that I am now standing or walking in a forest. It is, Hei- 
degger says, quite the opposite: the world is always already ›there‹ in everything we meet 
and encounter, and thus, everything that catches our attention and ›comes‹ to us does so 
innerworldly: in the world in which we ourselves are, and to which we are attuned, atten-
tive, caring and understanding. With Heidegger’s own example, what is »nearest to us is 
[...] the room, not as what is ›between the four walls‹ in a geometrical, spatial sense, but 
rather as material for living«, and in which the useful things get their usefulness from 
their relation and »belonging to other useful things: writing materials, pen, ink, paper, 
desk blotter, table, lamp, furniture, windows, doors, room« (BT/SZ, § 15, S. 64/68).
Each thing gets its relevance, serviceability and functionality »together with some-
thing else3 (i.e., the other things at hand, own clarification). The character of being of 
things at hand is relevance« (BT/SZ, § 18, S. 78/84). In our everyday going-about in the 
world, we as human beings do so without giving it much thought. There is an unheeded 
familiarity in the handiness of the various things at hand with which we manage our lives 
and go about in the world; things do not show themselves individually, one by one, and 
eventually constitute a whole or sum of things, but rather – as already pointed out – quite 
the opposite.
3 Sartre, in the introduction to Being and Nothingness, says that one of the great achievements of mod-
ern thought, not least existential phenomenology, is that it has managed to overcome the dualisms 
»which have embarrassed philosophy« for so long, and that »the appearances which manifest the 
existent are neither interior nor exterior; they are all equal, they all refer to other appearances, and 
none of them are privileged« (Sartre, 1943, S. xxi). We know, understand and make sense of the phe-
nomena that we experience, from and in their relations to other phenomena with which they appear, 
and »the appearance refers to the total series of appearances and not to a hidden reality [...]« (ibid). 
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When, for example, we get up in the morning and have breakfast with our family, we 
do so without giving the handling of the useful things much thought. From opening the 
cabinet and taking out the box of cereal, and opening the fridge to take out the carton of 
milk, we pour it all into the bowl that we have placed on the table in front of the chair that 
we are about to sit in to scoop the mix of cereal and milk with a spoon, one mouthful at 
a time, into our mouth. The spoon gets its relevance from its ability to scoop; the scoop-
ing gets its relevance from its ability to satisfy our basic need for food; and the satisfaction 
of basic needs is relevant to the protection and preservation of our life and to the preser-
vation and protection of Da-sein (for other examples, see BT/SZ, § 18, S. 78/84). Heideg-
ger’s point is that we can establish this chain of relation in all aspects of our lives. Replace 
the spoon with anything else – a screwdriver, for example – and you will be able to estab-
lish the same ›chain’ or »totality of useful things« in which each useful thing can be, what 
it ›is’ (BT/SZ, § 15, S. 64/68). This is not least obvious in regard to the life we live in our 
late modern societies, and our use of various types of technology ranging from our com-
puters and smartphones to GPS and self-monitoring devices (just to mention a few of the 
most obvious ones) that are all integrated, useful things in our lives.
It happens, however, that we either ›dis-attach‹ or dis-relate ourselves from our un-
heeded and familiar handling of the things at hand, or that the things at hand appear to 
be ›out of place‹, not really fitting the context in which we meet them (a friend of mine 
has a bicycle frame that has been painted over, hanging on his living room wall; instead 
of being relevant as a means of transportation, it is now relevant as a piece of art). In 
situations like that, the handy things at hand change status and instead become ›objects‹ 
(for lack of a better word), or objectively present things that are thus characterized by »the 
objects way of being« (Wentzer 2008, S. 98). It is »the being of beings (objective presence) 
that is found and determined by discovering them in their own right in going through 
beings initially encountered«, as distinguished from the handiness’ »innerworldly beings 
initially encountered« (BT/SZ, § 18, S. 82/88). It is the ›neutral‹, dis-attached, rational and 
(again: for lack of a better word) ›objective‹ encountering of the objects; the dis-engaged, 
objectivized attitude – an ›outerworldlycation‹ or ›dis-innerworldlycation‹ of the things 
at hand. 
Returning to the example with the spoon, we can also look at it just as an object made 
out of some kind of metal. An object that can then be used to dig small holes in the vege- 
table garden to sow seeds to grow Brussel Sprouts; or an object that can be used to pick 
up the dogs’ poo in the garden, so we do not step in it when we go there to play football. 
Or we may have displaced the screwdriver when we need it (the screw holding the door 
hinge is loose, and thus the door may fall off) and, in need of an if-not-permanent then 
at least a temporary solution, we look for something other than a screwdriver that may be 
able to do the job. Something of the right size that we can hold and turn in our hand, that 
will fit just nicely enough into the slot of the screw that it will allow us to turn it so it goes 
back into the door frame. On the table is a dinner knife that just about fits such a descrip-
tion and requirement. In that moment, the dinner knife becomes an ›objectively present 
thing‹ which is no longer just relevant as a tool that is designed to assist me during dinner, 
but for the moment also relevant as ›something else‹. When we do that, we ›take a step 
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back‹ from the intuitive, familiar and ›natural‹ use of the tools we call by the name of 
spoon or dinner knife, and with which we consume food, to perceive and think of them 
as objects or ›things‹ that we might consider using for something else. Therefore, all be-
ings exist in the form of relevance that is specifically related to that particular situation in 
which they appear innerworldly. 
At some point, however, as the examples above show,
»the total relevance itself [however] ultimately leads back to a what-for which no 
longer has relevance, which itself is not a being of the kind of being of things at hand 
within a world, but is a being whose being is defined as being-in-the-world [...]. The 
primary ›what-for‹ is a for-the-sake-of-which. But the for-the-sake-of-which always 
concerns the being of Da-sein which is essentially concerned about this being itself in 
its being« (BT/SZ, § 18, S. 78/84).
When we eat, we do so to satisfy a basic need and preserve our lives. Using various types 
of tools supports us in doing so, and the tools are thus relevant as such. If we are fortunate 
enough, we may also eat to satisfy our desire for something that brings us some kind of 
pleasure: a particularly fine piece of meat, delicious vegetables or a nice glass of wine. 
However, all of that does not answer the simplest of all questions: what for? Why is pre-
serving life not only relevant, but important? Why is finding pleasure in eating (if not rel-
evant) important to me? When we are able to answer questions of this kind, Heidegger 
says, we have come to an understanding and thus (which I will address below), under-
standing is an existential (along with attunement and falling prey) of the Da-sein. This 
distinguishes Da-sein from other beings in that Da-sein
»is a being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically dis-
tinguished by the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being. 
[...]. Da-sein always understands itself in terms of its existence, in terms of its possi-
bility to be itself or not to be itself. Da-sein has either chosen these possibilities itself, 
stumbled upon them, or in each instance already grown up in them. Existence is de-
cided only by each Da-sein itself in the manner of seizing upon or neglecting such 
possibilities« (BT/SZ, § 4, S. 10/12).
In the postscript to the Danish translation of Sein und Zeit, Associate Professor of philos-
ophy Thomas S. Wentzer explains that Heidegger’s concept of the Da-sein »as a percep-
tion of the being of the human being as a process, centered around the being of the hu-
man being itself«, not as an individual that is preoccupied with him- or herself, but as a 
being which is concerned with its own being (Wentzer 2007, S. 532) on an existential and, 
with a word that Heidegger uses repeatedly throughout the book, authentic (German: Ei-
gentlich) level of being.4 Da-sein understands itself, and with some explicitness, in its be-
4 Among the critics of Heidegger’s early work is the German-American philosopher and political 
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ing (BT/SZ, § 4, S. 10/12) and therefore does not concern itself with what it is, but how it 
is. When we find ourselves in situations where we come to ask if maybe the way we are 
living our life and the choices that we make in defining it are motivated by ›rational‹ 
measures and considerations imposed upon us by the society in which we live, rather 
than being an act of »authentic resoluteness« through which our Da-sein »hands itself 
down to itself« and to »the simplicity of its fate« (BT/SZ, § 74, S. 351/384), we do so out 
of a concern for our very – and authentic – being. An example could be the son who loves 
to sing and dance but who agrees to join the family business of selling cars because that is 
what is expected of him and ›what one does‹ in the time and place in which he lives. Sing-
ing and dancing may be his ›truest possibility‹, but in the »everyday-being-with-one-an-
other, Da-sein stands in subservience to the others« (BT/SZ, § 27, S. 118/126). Again: it is 
a process, not an individual or a subject:
»Da-sein is never to be understood ontologically as a case and instance of a genus of 
beings as objectively present. [...]. Da-sein is my own, to be always in this or that way. 
[....]. The being which is concerned in its being about its being is related to its being as 
its truest possibility. [....] because Da-sein is always essentially its possibility, it can 
›choose‹ itself in its being, it can win itself, it can lose itself, or it can never and only 
›apparently‹ win itself. It can only have lost itself and it can only have not yet gained 
itself, because it is essentially possible as authentic, that is, it belongs to itself« (BT/SZ, 
§ 9, S. 40/42).
By using terms such as ›truest possibility‹ and ›authenticity/in-authenticity‹ Heidegger 
makes a clear distinction between that which we are ›in ourselves‹, independent of any 
norms, perceptions, attitudes and general understandings held by ›the society‹ (Heide-
gger calls it the publicness of the They, which I will return to later). This is a concern which 
again and again circles around the question not of who we are as an individual ›I‹, but how 
we are: a process in which we on a more instinctive, word-less level are occupied with 
thinker, Hannah Arendt. In What is Existenz Philosophy? she argues that Heidegger descends to 
what can best be described as an »existential solipsism« in that he trifles with »all those modes of hu-
man existence which rest on the fact that Man lives together in the world with his fellows« (Arendt 
1946, S. 50), so that Man’s central concern is his own Self that is so clearly perceived when against 
the backdrop of the anticipation of his own death (BT/SZ, § 74, S. 351/384): »the essential charac-
ter of Man’s Being is determined by what he is not, his nothingness… Death may indeed be the end 
of human reality; at the same time it is the guarantee that nothing matters but myself« (ibid). I do, 
though, believe that Arendt gives Heidegger’s »being free for death« (BT/SZ, § 74, S. 351/384) too 
much importance and weight, and she gives too little importance to his emphasis on Da-sein’s being-
with-one-another and to Mitda-sein (BT/SZ, § 26), in which he stresses that »concern proves to be 
constitutive of the being of Da-sein which, in accordance with its different possibilities, is bound up 
with its being toward the world taken care of and also with its authentic being toward itself. Being-
with-one-another is based initially and often exclusively on what is taken care of together in such be-
ing. [...]. As being-with, Da-sein ›is‹ essentially for the sake of others« (BT/SZ, § 26, S. 115, 116/122, 
123). Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes the social condition of the human existence, to which I will 
give further attention later in this article. 
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being or come to be in a particular way; a way in which we appear to ourselves as what we 
were always already meant to be. That is why, in Heidegger’s work, there seems to be such 
a subtle distinction and delicate balance between winning and losing oneself: in a split se-
cond and in the tiniest of decisions, we may shift from being authentic to becoming inau-
thentic. All it takes is a change of focus from being concerned with our own being to 
being concerned with adhering to what is expected of us regardless of how it may affect 
our sense of self.
It is an urgent matter to Heidegger that human existence is not ›reduced‹ to being a 
subject that now and then, whenever it feels like it and is in the mood, decides to open up 
to the world around it in order to grasp and understand it. He strongly opposes the idea 
that the question of human understanding is to be reduced to what Husserl defined in a 
lecture as »the possibility of knowledge as such« (Husserl 1999, S. 16), and whether – or 
under what conditions – it is possible for a subject to establish a relation to a surrounding 
world of objects that allows it to experience these objects/this world ›as they are/it is‹. It 
is not, Heidegger writes, »that human being ›is‹, and then on top of that has a relation of 
being to the ›world‹, which it sometimes takes upon itself« (BT/SZ, § 12, S. 53/57). The 
epistemological-phenomenological understanding of the human being as a ›subject‹ 
which stands outside, opposite or in front of ›a world of objects‹; a human being which 
stands on the side of the world looking in at it, clouds the fact that the human being is not 
first and foremost an outside standing, perceiving and learning subject but rather a being 
that is embedded in a world that is always already ›there‹; a being that is always already 
›present-being‹ (German: Da-sein). The concept of a human being that ›has‹ an environ-
ment »does not say anything ontologically [...]. In its very possibility, this ›having‹ has its 
foundation in the existential constitution of being-in« (BT/SZ, § 12, S. 54/57-58). The hu-
man being does not ›have‹ a relation to the world; being-in means that the human being 
in its being, is its relation to the world. 
As mentioned above, two of the most basic existentials’ of Da-sein are understanding 
and attunement. When going about our daily life and doing things such as the activities 
mentioned in the examples above, we do so as human beings who exist in a world with 
which we are already familiar. We know and understand our world and are attuned to it 
at the same time as we encounter it.
Heidegger uses the term thrownness to describe how Da-sein is brought before itself 
and has already found itself »as one finds one’s self in attunement« (BT/SZ, § 29, S. 
128/135), surrendered to its own being. We are always already in a mood to which we are 
delivered, and thus, Da-sein is what it has to be, independent of its own free will and 
choice. We are thrown into our being and are responsible for it, whether we want it or not, 
and we are attuned to the situation in a way that lies beyond our control and which de-
fines our being-in-the-world: »In attunement lies existentially a disclosive submission to 
world out of which things that matter to us can be encountered« (BT/SZ, § 29, S. 129-
130/137-138). When attuned, we are in a mood (and can never not be in a mood and not 
attuned) that is at the same time something retrieved and forgotten, and something from 
which we are thrown into a future that is now made present (BT/SZ, § 68, S. 321/350). 
Time is – as the title of Heidegger’s book so clearly indicates – of the essence in our being-
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in-the-world, not as a succession of moments but, with a word that Heidegger borrows 
from Plato, ecstasies, indicating that time is not three-dimensional; it is a unified whole 
which is always ›here‹ in the now: »Temporality temporalizes itself as a future that makes 
present, in the process of having been« (BT/SZ, § 68, S. 321/350). Thus, attunement and 
understanding as existentials’ of the Da-sein fold themselves around the always present 
›now‹. 
When we are in a certain mood, we ›attune‹ ourselves to any given atmosphere of any 
given moment to which we respond. This attunement allows us to be affected or moved: 
to be astonished, amazed or disappointed when something either exceeds or falls short of 
our expectations; to be fearful when encountering a threatening situation; to be per-
plexed and irresolute when we find ourselves in a situation where our experiences, knowl-
edge and ability to deal with the situation seem inadequate; to be joyous or indifferent 
when …;, etc. Without our attunement to the world, we would not be able to experience 
something as astonishing/disappointing, fearful/safe, irresolute/resolute; joyous/indiffer-
ent, and thus, we would not be able to submit ourselves (in)to the world. It is, Heidegger 
stresses, not a psychical condition that calls for apprehension but rather an immanent re-
flection that can only »find ›experiences‹ because the there is already disclosed in attune-
ment«; It »assails Da-sein [...]. It comes neither from ›without‹ or from ›within‹, but rises 
from being-in-the-world itself as a mode of that being« (BT/SZ, § 29, S. 128-129/136). 
The attunement ensures that the human being, through its Da-sein, merges with the 
world of which it is always already a part. When our mood is bad, Heidegger says, we are 
prevented from this: blinded, Da-sein is disconnected from heedful and circumspect car-
ing.
The purpose of what we do, the relevance of the activities we engage in and the goals 
we strive to achieve always end up in an existential referring back to a ›for-the-sake-of-
which‹ that is not ›someone‹ or ›something‹ but rather its being in relationship and dia-
logue with Being as such or the phenomenon that calls Da-sein to act and be. Thus, Hei-
degger says, »we interpret (own italic) the meaning of the previous freeing of inner-
worldly beings initially at hand« (BT/SZ, § 18, S. 79/84-85) to understand the possible 
possibilities of that very thing at hand that meets us innerworldly. How, and to what ex-
tent, the situation we find ourselves in is, allows us to be authentic and our truest possi-
bility. As a temporal ecstasy, »understanding is grounded primarily in the future (antici-
pation or awaiting), [...] still [...] always a present that ›has been‹« (BT/SZ, § 68, S. 
321/350), which means that in Da-sein’s process of understanding, it projects its potenti-
ality-of-its-being into its future possibilities of being, while at the same time understand-
ing makes something present that already has been (i.e., a potentiality that is actualized 
in the present now). Given this temporality of understanding, Heidegger establishes pro-
jection as the existential structure of Da-sein: »It projects the being of Da-sein upon its for 
the-the-sake-of-which, which means Da-sein exists as itself [...] either authentic, origi-
nating from its own self as such, or else inauthentic« (BT/SZ, § 31, S. 136/145). It is an au-
thenticity that is closely related to the folding of the past-present-future of Da-sein’s be-
ing-in-the-world. Because time is to be understood as a unified whole, attunement must 
always have its understanding and understanding will always be attuned. Thus, »as essen-
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tially attuned, Da-sein has always already got itself into definite possibilities« (BT/SZ, § 
31, S. 134-135/143-144). It is only when the innerworldly being initially at hand is related 
to a for-the-sake-of-which that originates from Da-sein’s own self and accordingly has 
relevance as a ›what-for‹ that we as human beings are authentic in our being-in-the-
world. As quoted above, Da-sein belongs to itself and is always in this or that way, inde-
pendent of what other people – in a broader sense ›the public‹ – might think, want, de-
mand, desire or require.
4
And yet, in our everyday handling and going about in the world, we as human beings ad-
here to a representation of the world that is characterized by its averageness – its »average 
intelligibility« (BT/SZ, § 35, S. 157/168). According to Heidegger, the human being-with-
one-another is an ontological-existential condition of its existence: the ›I-here‹ is condi-
tioned by a ›you-there‹, and thus by an ›us‹ in the being-with-one-another. One of the 
consequences (if not problems) of this being-with-one-another is that it »dissolves one’s 
own Da-sein« (BT/SZ, § 27, S. 119/126), and that again paves the way for an ambiguity:
»Everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, grasped, and spoken whereas 
basically it is not, or it does not look that way, yet basically is. [....]. Not only does 
everyone know and talk about what is the case and what occurs, but everyone also al-
ready knows how to talk about what has to happen first, which is not yet the case, but 
›really’ should be done. Everybody has always already guessed and felt beforehand 
what others also guess and feel. This being-on-the-track is based upon hearsay – who-
ever is ›on the track’ of something in a genuine way does not talk about it – and this is 
the most entangling way in which ambiguity presents possibilities of Da-sein so that 
they will already be stifled in their power« (BT/SZ, § 37, S. 162/173).
Without drawing any further references or giving the impression of any kind of identity, 
Heidegger emphasizes what Foucault addresses, almost half a century later, in The Ar-
chaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1982) and in his inaugural lecture at College de France 
(Foucault 1971): that even though many people may harbor a »desire to find themselves 
[...] on the other side of discourse, without having to stand outside it, pondering its par-
ticular, fearsome and even devilish features« (Foucault 1971, S. 215), he or she is only too 
aware that it is not possible to say just anything at any time because he or she must abide 
to the many and imposing conditions required, if one is to talk (Foucault 1982, S. 44). Da-
sein, Heidegger says, is »subservient to the others. [....]. The everyday possibilities of be-
ing of Da-sein are at the disposal of the whims of the others« (BT/SZ, § 27, S. 118/126). 
Thus, the individual human being risks the consequence of being considered to be mad 
if he parts with »the common discourse of men« (Foucault 1971, S. 217). Our language is 
»under the dictatorship of the public realm, which decides in advance what is intelligible 
and what must be rejected as unintelligible« (Heidegger 2000, S. 85).
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That being said, and just to be clear, Heidegger and Foucault do not adhere to the 
same phenomenological understanding. As Heidegger’s Being and Time is a reckoning 
with epistemological phenomenology (BT/SZ §§ 12, 13), Foucault’s work is a reckoning 
with existential phenomenology (Raulet 1983), among which Heidegger’s philosophy 
must be counted. Foucault was occupied with that, and only that, which manifested it-
self in writing (which later came to include, when introducing the concept of the dis-
positif, institutions and architectural forms (Foucault 1980, S. 194)) and from which we 
can describe the archive: the set of rules that defines the limits and forms of conversa-
tion, memory, reactivation, appropriation and of the sayable (Foucault 1991, S. 59-60); 
the »law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as 
unique events« (Foucault 1982, S. 129), and thus a confined and limited collection of de-
tectable, tangible texts. Heidegger was occupied with a more intangible, in-confinable 
›the they‹ which is »nothing definite and which we all are« (BT/SZ, § 27, S. 119/126) and 
the Da-sein as a being which is concerned in its being about its being (BT/SZ, § 9, S. 
40/42). ›The they‹ is the neuter, which is not someone in particular, not me, not you and 
not the sum of all of us; it is The Others to whom Da-sein is – as already quoted – sub-
servient; the Da-sein that, in the taking care of things, is also being-with towards others, 
and not just itself. Furthermore, Da-sein is – as already mentioned – not a case or an ob-
jectively present being but a being which, by and large, is simply just concerned with its 
own being.
It seems, therefore, that Heidegger in Being and Time is ambiguous as to whether the 
publicness of ›the they‹ is to be held as something good and productive, or something 
that is essentially bad and destructive. One moment he uses paragraph after paragraph to 
emphasize, how »being absorbed in the world of taking care of things« prevents Da-sein 
from being itself (BT/SZ, § 26, S. 118/125); how the »publicness obscures everything, and 
then claims that what has been thus covered over is what is familiar and accessible to 
everybody« (BT/SZ, § 27, S. 119/127) and how this »fallen prey to the ›world‹« eventually 
leads Da-sein to fall away from itself (BT/SZ, § 38, S. 164/175). The next moment he in-
sists that the everydayness of being-with-one-another, which makes the everydayness 
and averageness of the being-in-the-world visible, is a condition that we have to accept 
because the existential ›I-here‹ is conditioned by the ›you-there‹, which again conditions 
the ›we‹ and ›us‹ and thus, that »the being-with-others belongs to the being of Da-sein 
[...]. As being-with, Da-sein ›is‹ essentially for the sake of others« (BT/SZ, § 26, S. 
116/123); it holds concern and care for one another: »Concern proves to be constitutive 
of the being of Da-sein which, in accordance with its different possibilities, is bound up 
with its being towards the world taken care and also with its authentic being towards it-
self« (BT/SZ, § 26, S. 115/122). 
So essentially, Da-sein is ›split‹ between the existential necessity to be concerned with, 
and care for, the common society and community in general, and its own being in par-
ticular. If it loses itself in the publicness of the they, it fails to concern itself with its very 
being. On the other hand, if it gets absorbed in its concern for its possibility of being it-
self, it fails in its being towards, and caring for, the world.
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In their article, Mølholm and Vetner (2018) describe the formation of discourses and the 
antagonistic relation between (some of) the discourses in the formation of discourses on 
the late-modern working life: the discourses on globalization and on lifelong, personal 
and professional learning and development on one side, and the discourse on stress and 
mental well-being on the other. While the former discourses are potent with agency, the 
latter is significant due to its lack of the very same. While the former discourses are fo-
cused on developing strategies to ensure that the societies in which we live will make it in 
a globalized world, by, among other things, employing the necessary means to develop 
human resources to their fullest potential, the latter addresses the downfall and side-ef-
fects of this race towards perfection and optimal performance in our endeavor to survive 
in a globalized world, consequently leading to a growing number of individuals becom-
ing ill with stress, depression and anxiety.
However, as Mølholm’s (2013) and Mølholm and Vetner’s (2018) works are a dis-
course-archaeological description of regularities that can only be carried out at the sur-
face of the emergence of discursive objects (Foucault 1982, S. 41), they can only ›see‹ what 
is visible and manifests itself in texts and, whether the various utterances have agency or 
– as is the case with the discourse on stress – do not. The significance of the absence of 
agency in the stress discourse is that agency has been replaced by anti-objectives that 
function as agents of avoidance, in utterances framed as ›do or be less‹ of something (e.g., 
flexible, dedicated, online 24/7, boundless) or ›you are not to be so much‹ of something 
other (e.g., exited, available, explorative) (Mølholm 2013; Mølholm/Vetner, 2018). These 
are highly ambiguous objectives, but objectives nonetheless. Two of the examples pre-
sented in the articles are the following:
»There is never a time of the day where you are not accessible, and therefore, there is 
always the possibility that flexibility leads to an increase in the level of stress« (The 
Week-letter A4 2014/0311).
»Structural conditions, such as boundless work [...], cause stress. Yet it is treated 
through advice and treatment directed at the individual, and if the employee expresses 
criticism, he is told to put on his yes-hat« (Information, 2014/1008).
These two examples5 are, as Mølholm and Vetner (2018) substantiate in their work, rep-
resentative of a stress discourse which, instead of agency and action markers aimed at re-
ducing stress, advances anti-objectives that are suggestive rather than directive. In the 
first example, the anti-objectives are to be less accessible and, as a consequence, less flex-
ible because we can reduce, rather than increase, the level of stress. In the second example, 
the anti-objectives are to be less forgiving with boundaries and to set up clearer and 
5 The first is a quotation from the Danish professor Helge Hviid, University of Roskilde; the second is 
a quotation from a (at that time) Master-student in philosophy and social science at the University 
of Roskilde, Kristian Haug.
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firmer divisions between work, family and leisure; to demand and display less enthusi-
asm while at the same time no longer treating the problem as if it is individual, thus sug-
gesting that we initiate collective measures instead. However, neither these two state-
ments nor the other statements representative of the stress discourse give clear and direc-
tive advice as to who, what, where and how we both collectively and individually deal 
with stress: organizationally, individually and as a common, societal problem.
As a consequence, the answers and solutions to the problem of a growing number of 
people becoming ill with work-related stress, depression and anxiety remain to be a yet-
to-be-disclosed place: a place in which the individual human being can be concerned in its 
being about its being in such a way, that he is able to balance the care for, and subservi-
ence to, The Other and the listening to The They, with care and concern for his own tru-
est possibility and potentiality so that he can be authentic and true to himself (BT/SZ, § 
18, S. 80/86), even when he is busy or exited (BT/SZ, § 9, S. 40/43).
It is a balance in a place that he has to find for himself. No ›common discourse of 
men‹ can guide him to that place because it is a place of his own. Without any agency, the 
discourse provides no common ground for the late-modern human being on which he is 
able to establish structural and/or individual solutions to the problem of stress. Never-
theless, establishing conditions – structural and individual – that allow the individual 
human to find his or her own yet-to-be-disclosed-place and to stay there, appear to be 
key to breaking the upward trend in the scale of work-related stress. The discourse on 
stress points in no specific direction other than away – yet not too far – from the dicta-
torship of the public realm which has so effectively subjectified the late-modern human 
being so that he is unconditionally dedicated to strive as hard as he possibly can to live 
up to the norms, attitudes, expectations and claims of flexibility, 24-7 availability, crea-
tivity, dedication and lifelong learning, and to adhere to the common understanding that 
globalization can be both heaven and hell, depending only on his ability to stay ahead of 
all the others. He is, Heidegger writes in his Letter on Humanism, challenged in finding 
the balance between being dictated by the publicness and paralyzed by the impotence of 
the private:
»But if man is to find his way once again into the nearness of Being he must first learn 
to exist in the nameless. In the same way, he must recognize the seductions of the pub-
lic realm as well as the impotence of the private« (Heidegger 2000, S. 86).
In the letter, Heidegger continues by saying that man must let himself be claimed by Be-
ing, during which he only seldom will have anything to say. In Being and Time, Heidegger 
says something similar: that the call of conscience which summons’ Da-sein – the being 
which is concerned in its being about its being – to its ownmost potentiality-of-be-
ing-a-self (BT/SZ, § 54, S. 249/269), »›says‹ nothing which could be talked about, it does 
not give any information about factual occurrences« (BT/SZ, § 58, S. 258/280). In the yet-
to-be-disclosed place, there is only the silence of a being that rests on the unstrained bal-
ance and the quietness of canniness.
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The unstrained balance and the quietness of canniness are, though, still more difficult to 
find and hold on to. From different perspectives, a number of recent studies point to an 
imbalance between the claims from a competitive society and the needs of the individual. 
For example, Rossi, Meurs and Perrewé (2016) state that 
»the frequent pressures and demands experienced in daily routine generate an intense 
and constant stress that affect a growing number of workers [...]. On the other hand, 
organizations are looking for highly productive and well-balanced employees, be-
cause only these will be able to show their talents and skills to the fullest. [...]. Exces-
sive tension has become so widespread today that it is no longer just a threat to quality 
of life, but a threat to life itself« (Rossi/Meurs/Perrewé 2016 S. ix), 
and Danish Psychologist Majken Matzau and High Performance and Nutrition Expert 
Umahro Cadogan (2014) state that 
»stress has become an escalating problem in recent years [...] where we float around in 
shambles of knowledge, information and communication, and both our professional 
and private roles are liquid and under constant pressure. [...]. The modern male has to 
realize his full potential in the knowledge-based labor market [...] and on top of that a 
subtler existential and spiritual realization of the higher potentials of his personality in 
the form of individualism and personal growth« (Matzau/Cadogan 2014 S. 53, 55). 
(For further examples see also Bloch 2001; Rasmussen 2005; Andersen/Brinkmann 2013; 
Lumholt/Mortensen 2015). 
In a feature article in the Danish newspaper Information6, Danish psychologist Dorte 
T. Viftrup, PhD, describes the situation of a Danish school teacher7 whom she is treating:
»She knows that she is not normal, because she cannot work, cannot achieve. She is 
also sad that Marius from 3.b is being bullied. She hasn’t been able to do anything 
about it. She suffers from sleeping problems, palpitations and concentration prob-
lems. She has, as many other Danes who are suffering from stress, not been able to live 
up to the claims from the society and working life of self-actualization, competence 
development, independence and flexibility. Of growth. Still more people suffer not 
only from stress, depression and anxiety. They also suffer from a guilty conscience, 
low self-esteem and a disappointment over themselves. Because they are unable to 
deal with the problems themselves« (Viftrup, 2015b).
6 The example is also given in Mølholm and Vetner’s article on the stigma of stress and the absence of 
agency (2018). 
7 Viftrup tells a similar story in the article psykisk sundhed som relationsevne (2015a). 
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What the school teacher does not realize is that she is probably experiencing not so 
much a disappointment in her ability to realize her own self but rather a disappointment 
in the realization of the they’s version of it. She feels this because in our late-modern so-
ciety, the realization of the self (in order to become the best and most authentic version 
of yourself) and the optimal exploitation of one’s individual, human potential so that so-
ciety can succeed in global competition have become one and the same (Andersen 2013, 
S. 37). Therefore, the school teacher’s image of her true self and society’s version of that 
image have gradually merged. Thus, failing to meet the expectations of society and to 
constantly improve your performance has become the same as failing to realize and uti-
lize your full potential and become, what you – authentically – were meant to be. The 
existential nearness of Being in an authentic Da-sein has been colonized and cloaked by 
the material distance of the they. In her article Psykisk Sundhed Som Relationsevne, (Vif-
trup 2015a), with reference to the Danish professor in psychology Svend Brinkmann, 
Viftrup makes a direct connection between the individual’s inability to comply with the 
demand to be flexible, realize his full potential through education and work and con-
stantly increase his skills and competences on one side, and stress, depression and other 
mental illnesses on the other (Viftrup 2015a, S. 135). Furthermore, the identity of the in-
dividual human being and his ability to act is, Viftrup continues, developed in relation to 
others, and if he is alienated in this relation »he loses a part of, and is alienated to, him-
self« (Viftrup 2015a, S. 142).
Heidegger’s gloomy warning not to get »lost in the publicness of the they and its idle 
talk« (BT/SZ, § 55, S. 250/271) has an ominous ring to it, almost as a premonition of 
darker times to come when in »the self-certainty and decisiveness of the they, it gets 
spread abroad increasingly that there is no need of authentic, attuned understanding. The 
supposition of the they that one is leading and sustaining a full and genuine ›life‹ brings 
a tranquilization to Da-sein, for which everything is in ›the best order‹ and for whom all 
doors are open« (BT/SZ, § 38, S. 166/177). What Heidegger did not know at the time 
when he wrote Being and Time was how significantly the labor market and organizational 
life would change after WW2 in the direction of a democratization and humanization of 
the working life in a number of European countries (Miller/Rose 1994, S. 33).
From the 1950s onwards, research established how increased influence and responsi-
bility, participation, self-management, self-realization, flexibility and – not least – life-
long learning and education opportunities had a dramatic influence on the productivity, 
efficiency, job satisfaction, competitiveness and quality of the products (Miller/Rose 
1994; Miller/Rose 1995) of the worker. Strikingly enough, as the worker became more 
productive, hard-working and stable, he simultaneously became more grateful – he 
started giving more to the workplace and was happy to do so.
The research was based on the basic assumption that human beings innately strive to-
wards personal growth (Korsgaard 1999, S. 145). Self-actualization through the realiza-
tion of one’s full potential became, as the example above so clearly emphasizes and con-
firms, the ›new‹ normal, and the concept of lifelong learning, as Danish Professor Knud 
Grue-Sørensen remarked after the UNESCO conference in Tokyo 1972, occurred with an 
almost catchphrase-like ring of both promise and requirement (ibid, S. 144). As a result, 
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there are no limits to the individual’s ability to constantly learn and develop, and lifelong 
learning is therefore, as my friend and colleague Professor Norman Longworth once said 
with a smile on his face, literally ›from lust to dust‹: the individual human being is forever 
destined to be in a state of incompleteness, always in a process of striving for a higher 
level of competence. Words such as good enough or as good as it can get are therefore 
meaningless. He who might be under that delusion is, as former Head of Market at Dan-
ish Trade and Service Lars Goldschmidt said in 2004, »in need of reality-therapy« (Kudahl 
2004, S. 19) and lacks a proper and acceptable attitude. Or, as the principal of a local 
school said in an interview that I conducted in the fall of 2000 in connection with a North 
Denmark Learning Region project: To those of my teachers who believe that they have fin-
ished educating themselves I say, that if you believe that then you are more finished than 
educated. 
Undoubtedly, human potential is now seen as a resource to be exploited on the same 
level as any other natural resource, and individual competencies are capital that has be-
come an object of quantitative measurements, calculations and evaluations. Human po-
tential for constant growth through self-realization has become an object of investment 
and strategic planning at all levels of society. What started as a humanistic Bildungs pro-
ject8: supporting the individual human being’s striving toward growth, development and 
self-actualization on his own terms, ended up becoming, as a consequence of an ever 
more globalized world, a production- and market instrument (Andersen 2013, S. 36 – 
37). This shift occurred as a reaction to outside circumstances – an ever more globalized 
world – and to forces that created an urgent need to exploit every resource, the human 
included, to the fullest. As a result, the realization of the full potential of the human popu-
lation is no longer an individual Bildungs project. It has ›moved out‹ of the individual hu-
man being and into the public sphere, in which each citizen – from cradle to grave – 
»compares itself with everything« during which he »drifts towards an alienation« (BT/
SZ, § 38, S. 166/178). It is a fold-up of the Da-sein and the they.
Gradually, the late-modern human being is subjectified with the norms and attitudes 
of lifelong learning, self-actualization and the realization of his full potential. This is a 
positive form of attention rich on the energy stemming from the focus on the qualities of 
the individual, which constantly reminds the individual of his excellence; a positive form 
of attention that, like a spur, urges him to work still harder and strive ever higher. How-
ever, as the American historian Christopher Lasch remarks in his book The Culture of 
Narcissism, it also makes the late-modern human being dependent on others to support 
and uphold his self-esteem: »he cannot live without an admiring audience« (Lasch 1979, 
S. 22). In an article in the Danish newspaper Information, philosopher Arno Victor 
Nielsen explains how a bank manager at the Danish bank Middelfart Sparekasse had trou-
ble bringing his employees’ enthusiasm for work under control:
8 The German term Bildung is equivalent to the Danish term dannelse, but has no equivalence in Eng-
lish. It refers to the individual’s endeavor to part with his own particularity in order to »rise to the 
universal [...]« (Gadamer 2004, S. 11). Among other things, this means »learning to affirm what is 
different from oneself and to find universal viewpoints from which one can grasp the thing, ›the ob-
jective thing in its freedom‹, without selfish interest« (ibid, S. 12). 
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»The bank manager had to force his employees to take time off. The bank had estab-
lished so many bonus arrangements and appreciative leadership methods that the em-
ployees became addicted to the praise and rewards they got at work. [....]. Life outside 
work became poor in comparison to life at work. At first, it seems as if the individual 
employee got more freedom, but the result was that they were constantly at work. In 
reality, the behavior of the employees was controlled by the reward structures that 
came with the flexible work« (Nielsen in Riel 2011, October 25th.). 
Thus, ›opening all the doors‹ to a full and genuine life has its price. The tranquilization of 
the Da-sein, Heidegger points out, is not a restful place but rather a very busy one: »This 
tranquilization in authentic being, however, does not seduce one into stagnation and in-
activity, but drives one to uninhibited ›busyness‹. Being entangled in the ›world‹ does not 
somehow come to rest« (BT/SZ, § 38, S. 66/177-178). The individual human being has to 
keep moving if he is to retain the attention of an admiring audience who, on top of 
everything else, also expect him to be creative and innovative – to perform, produce or 
imagine something new and not yet seen. In this busy place, the German sociologist 
Hartmut Rosa says, the escalating exhaustion of the late-modern self, which is empiri-
cally evident in the form of the growing prevalence of clinical depression and burn-out 
syndrome, can be imputed to the fight for recognition which literally starts over every 
day (Rosa 2014, S. 70).
The school teacher in the example above does not seem to receive any admiring 
glances whatsoever. She appears to be only too aware that having been given all the op-
portunities to succeed, and yet failed, she has to carry the burden of failure and the re-
sponsibility of ›abnormality‹, all by herself (Viftrup 2015a, S. 135). In addition, she is, Vif-
trup says, typical of all those suffering from stress, depression and anxiety who are bur-
dened by a guilty conscience, low self-esteem and disappointment in themselves. She 
appears to be ›out of tune‹ in that she, in the words of Heidegger, had »become tired of 
itself. (Her) being has become manifest as a burden« (BT/SZ, § 29, S. 126-127/134).
Viftrup’s story about the school teacher exemplifies the anti-objectives of the discourse 
on stress. It displays a vague yet-to-be-disclosed-place in which the individual human be-
ing can be authentic. Viftrup emphasizes the influence of society’s escalating demands on 
the individual, but she does not – as is generally the case in the articles and books (aca-
demic and popular alike) addressing the issues of stress, depression and anxiety – give any 
unambiguous and clear agency to the discourse on stress. However, Viftrup is – as is 
Nielsen – clearly pointing to the potential damage to the individual human being’s possi-
bility to be his true, authentic self, if and when he gets too caught up in listening to the they 
and, on the one hand, is seduced by the promising attention to, and seeming admiration 
of, his unique potential for growth, and, on the other hand, he gets addicted to and trapped 
in the requirements of flexibility, dedication and self-actualization. The school teacher is 
clearly described as someone who is in what Heidegger calls a bad mood and thus as some-
one who is blinded and disconnected from the heedful and circumspect caring for herself 
(BT/SZ, § 29, S. 128/136). She is portrayed in such a way that she appears to be failing at 
being her authentic, own self, where she would be concerned in her being about her truest 
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possibility. She had heard what society expected from her, but she was unable to act ac-
cordingly and that made her a disappointment not only to society but also to herself. Her 
attunement to the situation is used to exemplify a general condition in the labor force, 
where failing to meet the demands and expectations of society is a defeat so severe that it 
effectively prevents the individual from caring about his or her own being as being. In this 
way, the late-modern worker, being unable to deal with the situation itself, not only fails to 
hear her own self when it gets lost in the publicness of the they but also, ashamed and dis-
honored, loses her ability to hear the call of her conscience even when all is not, Heidegger 
says, lost »to him who wants to be brought back« (BT/SZ, § 55, S. 251/271).
The employees at Middelfart Sparekasse also heard what their manager expected 
from them and had reacted positively to the combined financial and emotional incen-
tives. They too are described as ›not free‹, as they became so dependent on the potential 
positive attention from their leaders that they were unable to leave the stage where they 
could be seen, acknowledged and appreciated by those around them: in the work sphere 
specifically, and in society more generally, they were unable to hear the call from their 
conscience and thus, not free to be their true, authentic selves.
Therefore, it takes a different type of hearing to be able to hear that wordless, silent 
and nameless ›voice‹ – the call of conscience. It is an ability to hear that which was origi-
nally there but is now »numbed by the ›noise‹ of the manifold ambiguity of everyday 
›new‹ idle talk« (BT/SZ, § 55, S. 251/271). In being without words, it is – it must be, Hei-
degger says – a silent call that requires the individual human being to first shut his mind 
to the loud, persistent and insistent voices from the surrounding world so that he can 
hear the call. The existential conscience calls from within Da-sein itself, from its »uncan-
niness [...] as not-at-home« (BT/SZ, § 57, S. 255/276) and »forth from its lostness in the 
they« (BT/SZ, § 57, S. 253/274). It has »the character of summoning Da-sein to its own-
most potentiality-of-being-a-self, by summoning it to its ownmost quality of being 
a lack«9 (BT/SZ, § 54, S. 249/269), »out of [its] falling prey to the they« (BT/SZ, § 57, 
S. 256/277). In other words, Heidegger emphasizes the Being of Da-sein as both the 
source and the key to bringing Da-sein into balance with its authentic self. The call of 
conscience is similar to the sound of dissonance that arises when something gets out of 
tune – in this case, according to Heidegger, Da-sein’s attunement to the world.
Heidegger points specifically to »information services such as the newspaper« (BT/
SZ, § 27, S. 119/126) when he wants to point to the source of the origin of the alienation 
of the self »which closes off to Da-sein its authenticity and possibility« (BT/SZ, § 38, S. 
166/178). Considering how the level and magnitude of information services have in-
creased since Heidegger wrote Being and Time more than 90 years ago, I believe we can 
safely assume that if he were alive today, he would be even more concerned and find that 
he had that much more reason to sound the alarm.
When analyzing the discourse on stress, I find that sounding the alarm is precisely 
what the vast majority of researchers and professionals are doing. They point, as already 
9 In German: »Der Gewissensruf hat den Charakter des Anrufs des Daseins auf sein eigenstes Selbst-
seinkönnen, und das in der Weise des Aufrufs zum eigensten Schuldigsein.«
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mentioned, to the overwhelming amount of communication from society – the »public 
›surrounding world‹« (BT/SZ, § 27, S. 119/126) – urging and inciting the late-modern 
human being to be vigilant, flexible, dedicated, lifelong and life-wide learning, efficient, 
pro-active, creative, innovative, courageous, fresh, energetic, resourceful, goal-oriented 
individuals (feel free to add more), as (one of) the primary causes of stress, depression 
and anxiety. At the same time, therefore, from an existential point of view, the discourse 
on stress allows us the opportunity to understand the yet-to-be-disclosed-place as that 
which Heidegger calls the existential conscience, and the vague anti-objectives as the 
wordless call that summons us from our lostness in the common, binding understanding 
of what it means to be a ›normal‹ human being in late-modern working society. To be 
part of today’s society, being-with-one-another somehow dissolves the individual human 
being’s ability to be himself.
However, Heidegger explicitly describes this »not-being-its-self« as something which 
»functions as a positive possibility of beings«: a nonbeing that »must be conceived as the 
kind of being of Da-sein nearest to it and in which it mostly maintains itself« (BT/SZ, § 
38, S. 164/176). It almost appears as if there is a constant battle within the individual hu-
man being between listening to the they and listening to the call of the conscience. There 
is a battle between, on one hand, subservience to others in the everyday being-with-one-
another, and those with whom the individual takes care of things and the world in which 
he lives and, on the other hand, listening to the voice that wants to bring Da-sein back to 
itself. Therefore, Heidegger almost sounds both defeatist and defiant at the same time: as 
if we have to accept falling prey and giving up on our ownmost self if we are to be a co-
herent, functioning society, yet we must also let ourselves be summoned and take up the 
fight to get back to being our ownmost self.
If balancing these two antagonistic considerations and necessities was difficult in the 
mid-1920s, it is no wonder that it seems almost impossible today. The example of the 
school teacher illustrates the battle between explicit care for society and the unspoken, 
nameless concern for the ownmost potentiality of the self. Viftrup’s articles are an exam-
ple of the regularity with which the discourse on stress mainly focuses on how the claims 
of society are increasing the burdens on the working man; such articles are characterized 
by anti-objectives that function as agencies of avoidance: a less careful listening and 
adhering to the claims and expectations of society, which would make it possible to hear 
the call of the conscience calling »from afar, to afar« (BT/SZ, § 55, S. 251/271). Perhaps 
what the discourse on stress is indirectly urging us to do is said best by our local priest 
Lene Riger-Kusk in her sermon of September 4th. 2016, with reference to the story where 
Jesus visits Martha (Luke 10, 38-42):
»Maria’s sister Martha isn’t here with us today. [...]. If Martha is here she is sitting at the 
edge of her chair, because there might be something that she has to take care of. And 
then she has to leave. Just briefly. Then hopefully she will be able to make it back 
again. Because Martha is busy. There is a lot one has to get done. And if you are a con-
scientious and responsible human being who wants to do things, as well as possible, 
then there isn’t much time to suddenly sit down in the middle of it all and just be. Mar-
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tha is a modern human being who wants to be a part of as many things as possible and 
miss out on as little as possible. Therefore, she is always on the move. Always on. Al-
ways on her way. […]. In a life and an existence and an everyday life where we often 
come to make exaggerated demands, the solutions are not to sleep a little less, run a 
little faster or plan our calendar more effectively. What we need is a place of refuge. A 
place where we don’t have to be poised ready for anything or anyone. A place where we 
are looked at with eyes that does not expect anything from us other than being content 
with who we are. […]. No human being is able to give and ›be on’ all the time.«
However, that is what is required of her, due to the acceleration of the pace of life, the ac-
celeration of social changes and the technological acceleration that characterizes 
late-modern life (Rosa 2014), caused by the logic of competition that drives it. This situ-
ation creates a fatal combination of growth and acceleration that is based on the equation 
between time and money made by Benjamin Franklin, and according to which it is con-
tinuously essential to find ways to either/both spare or/and spend more time, to gain ad-
vantage over her direct competitors to get the education she wants, the job she desires to 
either get or hold on to, the husband and family she dreams of, etc. She has to dedicate 
more energy – time and effort – to uphold her competitive advantage, which ultimately 
leads to a situation in which the sustaining of this advantage is no longer a means of liv-
ing an independent life guided by self-defined goals but instead becomes an overriding 
goal for societal life as well as individual existence. Thus, the acceleration eventually 
»transforms the forms of human subjectivity and our ›being-in-the-world‹« (Rosa 2014, 
S. 50). It is an acceleration which »indicates a deep, structural distortion of the relation 
between the self and the world and between the various ways in which the subject is situ-
ated or ›localized‹ in the world« (Rosa 2014, S. 96).
The Danish psychologist and writer Nadja Prætorius describes this outer-defined 
alienation in which we conform to the reifying perspective of the surrounding world as a 
dehumanization that occurs without our even realizing it and in which we are deprived of 
the experience of something intimate and authentic; something meaningful and real 
about being that human being and the fellow human being that one has the potential to 
be (Prætorius 2013, S. 188-189). We are, as individual human beings, torn between our 
responsibilities and obligations to ›The Other‹ and our consideration for our ownmost 
potentiality of being a self.
Towards the end of his book Stå Fast (Eng. Stand Firm), Brinkmann (2014) says that 
›who I am‹ is defined by the promises and obligations I have for others; what has signifi-
cance in life and who I basically am, is thus a manifestation hereof. In an accelerated so-
ciety in which technological innovations have obliterated the distances in space and time 
the question is, though, who ›the others‹ are since they are potentially everyone. For ex-
ample, my colleagues are not just those sitting in the same building as I, but everyone 
working at my university, plus every other person in the world who may find inspiration 
in my work to do theirs, and who may therefore send me an e-mail, give me a phone-call 
or send me a request of all sorts via LinkedIn, Facebook or some other social media; my 
students are not just the few young women and men that follow my classes and study in 
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our Master’s program, but potentially every student at my university (and others, for that 
matter); my friends are not just those with whom I have a close and intimate relation but 
(potentially) everyone I am friends with in the virtual world of the already mentioned so-
cial media. In a world where everyone is potentially ›the other‹ it has become still more 
difficult to define and decide who and what has enough significance in our lives that they 
and that deserve our obligation and the right to define who we are. We give, as the Ameri-
can blogger and writer Mark Manson so eloquently put it, way too many fucks about way 
too many things and have, during that process, lost track and sight of what is truly impor-
tant to us (Manson 2016). And one thing is for sure: we cannot, as Riger-Kusk said in her 
sermon, give and ›be on‹, all the time.
7
Since the end of WW2, the human Existenz has, without a doubt, come under continu-
ously stronger and more significant pressure than ever before in the history of man, with 
a tendency among the working population to have surrendered to the dictatorship of 
publicness. As a thrown being-in-the-world, Da-sein in its uncanniness has literally lost 
its sense of self in that the call of conscience is, as Heidegger formulates it, »like an alien 
voice« (BT/SZ, § 57, S. 255/277). In its unfamiliarity it makes no sense; we have become 
disconnected to our potentiality-of-being-a-self. Misconceiving the they self with our 
ownmost-potentiality-of-being-a-self, failing to meet the expectations of constant 
growth, personal and professional development, dedication and flexibility is confused 
with listening to and answering the summoning of the call from our existential con-
science.
Nonetheless, in the anti-objectives of the discourse on stress we ›hear‹ that alien, 
wordless voice calling us from afar to afar, to that which is always an individual yet-to-be-
disclosed-place, yet the sound of a common truth that fills ›us‹ – the collective ›we‹ – with 
an existential Angst, unrest and discomfort. Thus, even though it may – to some degree 
rightfully – be perceived and interpreted as yet another burden put on the shoulders of an 
already overburdened, late-modern human being, and yet another deficit to feel guilty 
about not being able to level out, it is very much a common responsibility to make an ef-
fort to change the discourses that govern the working-life of the late-modern human be-
ing, so that the discourse on stress comes to hold the agency that will allow us simply to 
be.
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